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Abstract
The success of global climate policies over the coming decades depends on the diffu-
sion of ’green’ technologies. This requires that international environmental agreements
(IEAs) and trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) interact productively.
Using a simple and tractable model, we highlight the strategic reduction in abatement
commitments on account of a hold-up effect. In anticipation of rent extraction by the
innovator signatories might abate less than non-signatories turning the IEA ’brown’.
Self-enforcing IEAs have fewer signatories and diffusion can reduce global abatement
under TRIPs. Countries hosting patent holders extract rents from TRIPs, but may be
better off without them.
JEL codes: Q54, Q55, O34, O33, L12
Keywords: International climate policy; diffusion of innovations; intellectual property
rights; hold-up problem.
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1 Introduction
Over the next 20 to 25 years, much of climate-relevant technological change is expected to
come from the international diffusion of technologies that are already known (Metz et al.
2007).1 While some of these ’green’ technologies are in the public domain, the vast major-
ity of them is owned by private corporations located in industrialized countries (Hall and
Helmers 2013, Reichman et al. 2008). These entities expect to enjoy the benefits of ownership
of their intellectual property rights (IPRs) for most of the next two decades. This expec-
tation rests, at the international level, on mechanisms such as the system of Trade-Related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) that obligates countries that aspire to World Trade
Organization (WTO) membership to erect a domestic system of effective and enforceable
IPRs.
Recent discussions have started to challenge the merits of IPRs on climate-relevant tech-
nologies and their enforcement through TRIPS. International bodies and non-governmental
organizations have floated ideas for possibly drastic limitations on TRIPs for such technolo-
gies on the grounds of encouraging their adoption in developing countries and of international
equity considerations (Lee et al. 2009). Examples for such limitations include compulsory
licensing and revocation of IPRs in developing countries (UNFCCC 2010). Individual coun-
tries, such as India, have also suggested shorter patent durations for climate-relevant tech-
nologies (WTO 2013). This contrasts with the position of policy-makers in industrialized
countries in which most of the corporations with the relevant IPR are located. They have
declared their intention to defend vigorously the international protection of ’green’ IPR and
push ahead with TRIPs (Rimmer 2009), not least because many have embraced the notion
that the patent rents that will be generated in the course of diffusing ’green’ technologies un-
der TRIPs will offset some of the domestic costs of climate policies (Foxon 2010, Fankhauser
et al. 2008). Whether TRIPS constitute the right institutional mechanism under which
the process of diffusion of ’green’ technologies should take place is therefore under debate.
Advancing this debate, however, will require not only a better understanding of issues of
distribution in international climate policies, namely how rents from green technologies are
shared internationally. At least equally important are issues of efficiency that arise where
decisions on international systems of IPRs intersect with international agreements on green-
house gas emissions.
In the present paper, we explore a new mechanism through which a global system of
IPRs affects the efficiency of global climate policies. This mechanism captures the impact
of strategic considerations when countries decide on individual contributions to an interna-
tional environmental agreement (IEA) on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the presence
of IPRs on abatement technologies. The impact arises in the form of a hold-up problem
that affects both the formation and the content of the IEA on GHG emissions reductions.
The mechanism presented here is therefore in addition to the first-order concern that IPRs
on ’green technologies’ create temporary monopolies that restrict diffusion and decrease
abatement, which is the necessary deadweight loss associated with IPR-based innovation
rewards (Scotchmer 2004). The hold-up problem affects equilibrium abatement levels and
1Influential research has claimed that stabilizing the carbon stock in the atmosphere until 2050 at around
500 ppm can be plausibly met by a portfolio of currently existing technologies (’stabilization wedges’) while
underlying output growth continues (Pacala and Socolow 2004).
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the coalition size of the IEA, creating a significant additional distortion above and beyond
the deadweight loss of monopoly. In what follows, we establish the presence and impact of
the hold-up problem and point to possible solutions.
In order to deliver results that are intelligible in the context of a well-established litera-
ture, we adopt a parsimonious modeling approach for IEA formation and performance that
builds directly on the now classic model by Barrett (1994). In the same spirit, we assume a
global system of TRIPs, as intended by its proponents, and study how its presence impacts
on the formation of an IEA, on aggregate abatement, on global welfare, and on the welfare
of countries that host innovators.2 The participation game in the present paper involves
identical countries in a world of linear benefits and quadratic costs of abatement (Barrett
2006). There is an incumbent abatement technology that is freely available. An alternative
technology exists, but the IPRs are owned by a private innovator. Against this background,
countries simultaneously decide in stage 1 whether or not to join an IEA. In stage 2, those
who joined the IEA cooperatively commit to minimum abatement efforts. These commit-
ments can be met using any combination of the incumbent and the new technology, as in
Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) and Perino (2008). In stage 3, the innovator sets per-unit license
fees for the use of the new technology by signatories and non-signatories. Fourth, signato-
ries make adoption decisions honoring any minimum abatement commitment made in the
second stage. In the final stage 5, non-signatories simultaneously and non-cooperatively
make abatement and adoption decisions. In comparison to the existing literature, the novel
element here is the technology pricing step in stage 3 which occurs between the setting of
abatement targets by an IEA and their implementation by individual signatories.3
Using this model structure, we proceed in three steps. We first derive the equilibrium
abatement levels for a given size of the IEA and compare the equilibrium outcomes with the
standard results. This comparison yields the effects of hold-up that play out at the interface
of IEA choices and TRIPS: Mitigation efforts committed to during the negotiation of the
IEA reduce the demand elasticity of countries with respect to new technologies (Lemma 1).
Under TRIPs, innovators price their innovations such as to exploit their proprietary control
over access to the technology and increase the technology license fee when signatories of the
IEA have more ambitious abatement targets (Lemma 2). Anticipating this, signatories not
only internalize the public good dimension of their abatement efforts, but also strategically
choose their future demand elasticity for the new technology. This reduces their abatement
efforts compared to a world without proprietary pricing of the new technology. In extremis, a
fully fledged TRIPS can lead to IEAs of any size becoming either redundant for climate policy
or involving less abatement by signatories than by non-signatories (Proposition 1). While
an outcome of a highly stylized model, this stark result highlights the presence of strong
interactions between international IPR policies and climate change mitigation policies.
As a second step, we connect these findings with the literature on self-enforcing IEAs.
Using the equilibrium concept common to this literature, TRIPS reduces the number of
2Limitation of space dictate leaving out some important subtleties and problems raised by the recent
literature on IEAs. Crucial problems arising in implementation have been addressed e.g. by Bo¨hringer and
Lange (2005), Eichner and Pethig (2009) and Gersbach and Winkler (2011).
3In contrast to the standard Barrett model, the present approach is more explicit about the commitment
character of self-enforcing IEAs at the national level by separating target setting and implementation into
separate stages.
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signatories (Proposition 2) and can lead to lower aggregate abatement overall compared to
the case without innovation (Proposition 3).4 Globally, innovation of a second technology al-
ways improves welfare on account of the cost diversification effect (Proposition 4). However,
the country hosting the innovator is worse off with TRIPs in force than without (Proposi-
tion 5). The reason is that, while TRIPs generates patent rents that contribute to national
welfare, it also crowds out abatement by all other countries, and disproportionately so by
the IEA. Since all countries, with or without the innovator, are linked together through the
climate commons, the resulting climate change damages from enforcing TRIPs are always
strictly larger than the patent rents.
In the third and final step, we discuss possible solutions to the hold-up problem, restrict-
ing the discussion to solutions that do not require a protracted process of revoking TRIPS
on ’green’ technologies. Such solutions are, for instance, internationally funded patent buy-
outs as advocated in the context of pharmaceuticals. The common element is that each
one severs, in a different way, the functional link between countries’ international abate-
ment commitments and the prices they face for access to more advanced technologies. We
highlight one particularly salient possible improvement, namely the announcement of a price
ceiling by the innovator host country.
While this is the first paper to look at the interaction of a fully fledged TRIPS and
IEA formation and performance, this is by no means the first paper to look jointly at green
technologies and abatement at an international level. Buchholz and Konrad (1995) study
strategic technology choice by countries prior to negotiations. Stranlund (1996) considers
strategic technology transfers and its welfare effects. Tol et al. (2001) examine issue linkage
through technology diffusion in a climate game. Most recently Barrett (2006) and Hoel and
de Zeeuw (2010) frame the problem as two global public goods provision games in which
countries need to cooperate on both R & D provision and abatement. Harstad (2012, 2015)
studies a different hold-up problem arising from investment in superior abatement technology
prior to international negotiations taking place. Benchekroun and Ray Chauduri (2014)
find that eco-innovations can reduce the stability of IEAs when using a farsighted stability
concept. While our contribution shares features with these other papers, there are several
key differences. One is our interest in the effect of TRIPs on the international adoption of
existing technologies and on the IEA formation process. Given this focus on diffusion, we
do not consider upstream innovation and investments into national or international R&D
programs such as Harstad (2015), Benchekroun and Ray Chauduri (2014), Hoel and de Zeeuw
(2010) and Barrett (2006). Connected to this, our paper features a firm holding IPRs in an
advanced technology rather than a country. In this, the paper relates to a different literature
that studies endogenous pricing of abatement technologies under environmental regulation
(Laffont and Tirole 1996, David and Sinclair-Desgagne´ 2005, Requate 2005, Perino 2010) in
which the regulatory choices of a government and the pricing by the innovator interact in a
sometimes deleterious fashion. This parallel is in clear evidence in our headline results.
In the following section, we introduce the model of a climate change participation game
when an alternative technology can be provided under proprietary technology supply. Section
3 analyses the model for a fixed number of signatories to the IEA and identifies the key
4Adoption of a green technology has also been found to increase emissions in some cases by Perino
and Requate (2012). However, there innovation is vertical, policy domestic and pricing of the technology
competitive.
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strategic effect of the paper: the climate policy hold-up. Section 4 studies coalition formation
and presents results on coalition size, aggregate abatement and welfare effects of the IPR
regime in comparison to a world with competitive supply or absence of the new technology.
Section 5 discusses alternative systems of knowledge sharing and section 6 concludes. Proofs
are in the appendix.
2 Analytical framework
Following Barrett (2006), we model a world in which there are N ex-ante identical countries
facing a global public good problem. Each country i receives a benefit of
Bi = bQ, (1)
where Q =
∑
i q
i is the aggregate level of contribution to the public good (GHG abate-
ment) and b > 0 is the country i’s marginal benefit from abatement.
There are two abatement technologies available that can be used in any combination:5
One is an incumbent technology embodying knowledge that is not protected by an IPR and is
competitively provided on the market. We denote by xi ≥ 0 the amount of abatement that is
carried out in country i using that incumbent technology. The marginal cost of the incumbent
abatement technology is xi. The other abatement technology is a new alternative that relies
on privately owned IPRs. We denote by yi ≥ 0 the amount of abatement that is carried out
in country i using the alternative technology, for which the IPR owner charges a technology
license fee of p ≥ 0. Employing an additional unit of the alternative technology therefore
requires country i to give up p plus the marginal cost of abatement for this technology
denoted by dyi (with d > 0). To summarize, total abatement is the sum of the abatement
carried out using either of the technologies, qi = xi + yi, and country i’s total abatement
costs are given by
Ci
(
xi, yi
)
=
1
2
(xi)2 +
d
2
(yi)2 + pyi. (2)
The timing is as follows. In stage 1, countries simultaneously decide whether to sign an
IEA. In stage 2, signatories cooperatively commit to minimum abatement efforts anticipating
monopolistic pricing of the new technology. In stage 3, the innovator sets per-unit prices
(license fees) for the use of the new technology for signatories and non-signatories exploiting
third-degree price discrimination. Fourth, signatories make adoption decisions honoring any
abatement commitment made in the second stage. In stage 5, non-signatories simultaneously
and non-cooperatively make abatement and adoption decisions. As usual, the game is solved
by backwards induction.
3 TRIPs and IEAs with exogenous membership
We now turn to solve the last four stages of the game described above, excluding for the
moment the coalition formation stage. Treating the number of signatories as exogenous in
5The ability to use both technologies at the same time deviates from Barrett (2006) where technologies
are mutually exclusive, but shares similarities with Harstad (2012). Negative abatement in any one of the
two technologies is excluded.
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this way helps to identify the important change in the strategic setting of an IEA induced by
TRIPs. The coalition formation stage that gives rise to a self-enforcing IEA is then covered
in section 4.
3.1 Stage 5: Abatement and adoption by non-signatories
In the last stage of the game, non-signatories individually solve the following optimization
problem
max
xi,yi
bQ− 1
2
(
xi
)2 − d
2
(
yi
)2 − pnyi, (3)
where xi and yi, again, are the amounts of abatement provided through the old and
new technology, respectively. pn is the license fee paid by non-signatories for using the new
technology.
Assuming an interior solution and imposing symmetry among all non-signatories (n) the
equilibrium abatement levels are
xn = b, (4)
yn =
b− pn
d
. (5)
The amount of abatement provided by the non-signatory country using the incumbent
technology increases in the marginal benefits of abatement b. The use of the alternative
abatement technology also increases in b, but only net of the license fee charged by the
innovator, and decreases in the marginal cost of using the alternative technology d.
3.2 Stage 4: Abatement and adoption by signatories
In the abatement and adoption stage, signatories solve an optimization problem of the form
max
xi,yi
b
[∑
k
(xi + yi) + (N − k)
(
b+
b− pn
d
)]
− 1
2
(
xi
)2 − d
2
(
yi
)2 − psyi, (6)
s.t. xi + yi ≥ q¯, xi ≥ 0, yi ≥ 0
where q¯ is the minimum level of abatement each signatory committed to in the IEA
and k ∈ {0, N} is the number of signatories to the IEA. Signatories maximize their domestic
welfare. Cooperation is therefore limited to the commitment stage of the IEA. This highlights
the commitment character of abatement choices as part of an IEA that is not explicitly
modeled in the standard Barrett model where commitment and abatement occur in the
same stage of the game.6
6This might seem contrary to the spirit of self-enforcing IEAs covered in section 4. But there is a subtlety
here: The requirement of self-enforcement in IEAs highlights the difficulties of international policy commit-
ment between sovereign nations. The domestic policy commitment assumed here is less demanding. While
domestic policy commitment is not perfect, its successful provision is one of the very function of government
institutions. If governments could not restrict their own future actions to some degree, a credible patent
system would be infeasible. Models in which governments implement internationally declared abatement
targets rely on this ability to commit at home. To this extent, the commitment we make explicit here is
already implicitly present in the basic Barrett model.
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Two cases can arise at the abatement stage. Either the abatement target constraint
imposed by the IEA is binding or it is not. If it is binding, abatement is split over the two
technologies such that
xsbind =
dq¯ + ps
1 + d
, (7)
ysbind =
q¯ − ps
1 + d
. (8)
Signatories (s) therefore minimize costs by applying the equi-marginal principle. As a
result, abatement levels of both technologies depend on the abatement target q¯ and the price
paid for the new technology by signatories ps.
If the minimum abatement target constraint is not binding, signatories’ abatement levels
for the two technologies are
xsnonbind = b, (9)
ysnonbind =
b− ps
d
, (10)
and therefore identical to non-signatories’ abatement choices (if the license fee is the
same). In this case, actual abatement levels are independent of the initial commitment and
only the usage of the new technology depends on the level of the license fee.
Whether the minimum abatement level committed to by signatories in the IEA is binding,
depends of course on the license fee chosen by the innovator. If the license fee charged for the
use of the new technology ps is sufficiently low, i.e. below a critical level pˆs(q¯), signatories
might choose to abate more than the minimum level of q¯. The critical fee level is determined
by the condition that the sum of (9) and (10) is equal to the minimum abatement target q¯.
This yields
pˆs(q¯) = b(1 + d)− dq¯. (11)
Demand for the new technology by signatories is therefore given by
ys(ps) =
{
b−ps
d
if ps ≤ pˆs(q¯)
q¯−ps
1+d
if ps > pˆs(q¯)
. (12)
From (12) follows the first important building block of the climate policy hold-up problem
under TRIPs.
Lemma 1 (Price elasticity of technology demand) If the IEA’s abatement targets are bind-
ing, i.e. ps > pˆs(q¯), then the price elasticity of demand for the new technology by signatories
ys =
ps
q¯ − ps , (13)
is a decreasing function of their abatement target q¯.
Lemma 1 constitutes the demand side component of the hold-up problem: The more am-
bitious the abatement target of signatories, the higher the market power of the firm owning
the patent for the new technology. This has important strategic ramifications for both inno-
vator and signatories: While the innovator will aim to exploit this market power optimally
when pricing the technology, signatories have an incentive to decrease the abatement target
in order to limit the innovator’s market power.
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3.3 Stage 3: Technology pricing
The two prices ps and pn charged for using the clean technology are set by the innovator to
maximize its profits pi = k · ps · ys(ps) + (N − k) · pn · yn(pn). As the two markets (signatories
and non-signatories) are perfectly separated and identities easily observable, the innovator
can treat each market independently with demand functions for the new technology given
by (5) and (12), respectively. This leads to the second building block of the hold-up effect,
namely strategic technology pricing that exploits abatement commitments under appropriate
circumstances.
Lemma 2 (Strategic technology pricing) The innovator sets equilibrium prices for signato-
ries and non-signatories to the IEA according to
pn =
b
2
, (14)
ps =
{
b
2
if q¯ ≤ qˆ
q¯
2
if q¯ > qˆ
. (15)
The license fee to be paid by signatories increases in their abatement target for all q¯ >
qˆ = b
√
1+d
d
.
As has been established in the previous subsection, abatement targets are not binding
if the price of the new abatement technology is sufficiently low. In this case signatories
choose to exceed their targets. When setting the license fee for signatories, the innovator
hence faces the choice between making the abatement target binding by setting a price above
pˆs(q¯) and charging a lower price which results in abatement above target. Which is more
profitable depends on the target signatories committed to in the IEA. The threshold level qˆ
is the level where the innovator is exactly indifferent between the two pricing options. Note
that this critical level of signatories’ abatement target is below equilibrium abatement by
non-signatories (qˆ < xn + yn) yet imposes a binding constraint under conditions discussed
further below. By assumption, the innovator chooses the strategy that induces commitments
to be nonbinding and sets ps = b
2
whenever q¯ = qˆ.
To summarize, abatement by country type and technology is
xn = b, (16)
yn =
b
2d
, (17)
xs (q¯) =
{
b if q¯ ≤ qˆ
q¯ 1+2d
2+2d
if q¯ > qˆ
, (18)
ys (q¯) =
{
b
2d
if q¯ ≤ qˆ
q¯ 1
2+2d
if q¯ > qˆ
. (19)
3.4 Stage 2: Abatement commitments by signatories
The defining feature of an IEA is that its signatories cooperatively agree to commit to mini-
mum abatement levels q¯. In doing so, they internalize the public good character of abatement
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within the group of signatories. This allows IEAs to improve on the pure non-cooperative
state and at the same time creates incentives to form a self-enforcing IEA (discussed in the
next section) as abatement by signatories is increasing in the number of countries joining the
IEA. The decision on abatement commitments is complicated, though, by the proprietary
supply of the new abatement technology. Since the patent holder will supply signatories
and non-signatories at differential prices, signatories, acting cooperatively, will not behave
as price takers, but correctly anticipate the effect of their abatement commitments on future
license fees. Since the elasticity of demand for the new technology by signatories (Lemma
1) and, hence, their license fee are functions of the IEA’s abatement target (if it is bind-
ing), the more signatories are committing to abate, the more they become exploitable by
the patent holder (lemma 2). The hold-up problem therefore changes the decision problem
at the commitment stage. The partial internalization of the public good problem and the
hold-up effect work in opposite directions. The former increases abatement by signatories
compared to non-signatories but the latter reduces it.
Signatories face the following optimization problem
max
q¯
b
[
k [xs (q¯) + ys (q¯)] + (N − k)
(
b+
b
2d
)]
(20)
−1
2
(xs (q¯))2 − d
2
(ys (q¯))2 − ps (q¯) ys (q¯) .
Note that for all q¯ ≤ qˆ welfare of signatories is independent of q¯ because commitments
are not binding below this threshold. Signatories are indifferent between all q¯ ∈ [0, qˆ] and
each of these outcomes would be equivalent to a case without an IEA. This is apparent when
observing that the critical level of abatement qˆ is smaller than abatement by non-signatories.
Assuming for a moment that agreed targets turn out to be binding and imposing sym-
metry, the welfare maximizing abatement target that signatories commit to is
q¯bind = bk
4(1 + d)
4(1 + d)− 1 , (21)
with 1 < 4(1+d)
4(1+d)−1 < 4/3, i.e. abatement is higher than if the new technology were
not available (see appendix A.1). Next we need to identify the condition under which the
abatement target will indeed impose a binding constraint. Imposing q¯bind > qˆ yields the
minimum level of the cost parameter of the new technology dˆ(k) above which the IEA’s
targets are meaningful,
d > dˆ(k) =
3− 2k2 + k√4k2 − 3
4(k2 − 1) . (22)
This minimum cost parameter defines a cost threshold: If the new technology renders
abatement sufficiently cheap, then its international adoption by signatories is not subject to
strategic consideration. Note that the parameter, dˆ is decreasing in k, but strictly positive
for all k > 1. The more signatories there are to the IEA, therefore, the lower the cost of
the new technologies needs to be in order to escape the hold-up effect. As the following
proposition shows, the cost parameter therefore also determines the fundamental character
of the IEA.
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Proposition 1 (The Hold-Up Effect and ’Green’, ’brown’ and redundant IEAs) For a given
number of IEA signatories k > 1, the abatement target committed to by each signatory in
the presence of a new technology protected by TRIPs depends on the cost parameter of the
new technology in the following way:
• For all d > dˆ(k), the abatement target is binding, smaller than without TRIPs, but
higher than if the new technology is not available. Specifically,
– For all d ≥ d¯(k) = 5−4k+
√
16k2−16k+1
8(k−1) abatement by a signatory is (weakly) larger
than abatement by a non-signatory. The presence of the IEA increases total abate-
ment, i.e. the IEA is ’green’.
– For all dˆ(k) < d < d¯(k) abatement by a signatory is strictly smaller than by a
non-signatory. Total abatement is less than without an IEA and decreasing in the
number of signatories, i.e. the IEA is ’brown’.
• For all d ≤ dˆ(k), the abatement target is not binding. Signatories abate the same as
non-signatories, which is (weakly) more than the collectively agreed target, i.e. the IEA
is redundant.
The double effect of TRIPS on abatement choices are best understood by comparing
the content of Proposition 1 with the case in which the new technology is competitively
provided (i.e. no TRIPs). This is a special case of the current model where ps = pn = 0.7
Under TRIPS, two separate effects decrease abatement targets relative to the competitive
benchmark: Firstly, countries face higher (and differentiated) prices for the new technology.
This is the standard effect that pricing above marginal costs reduces abatement compared
to the situation where the technology is provided competitively. The second effect are
the strategic distortions between signatories and patent holder that reduce abatement even
further. Figure 1 separates the two effects graphically by plotting abatement levels as a
function of the abatement cost parameter of the new technology d. The difference between
abatement by a signatory under competitive provision (e) to abatement when license fees
are ex-ante fixed at their equilibrium levels (c) represents the first effect due to the change in
prices. The strategic reduction of abatement caused by the hold-up problem is illustrated by
the difference between (c) and (a). The figure also illustrates that monopolistic pricing and
price discrimination substantially reduce abatement, but do not create ’brown’ IEAs (see
appendix). The latter phenomen requires the hold-up problem, which induces signatories to
abate less than non-signatories for the range of parameters identified above.
’Brown’ IEAs follow from the condition that for d = dˆ(k) it holds that q¯bind = qˆ with the
latter being smaller than total abatement by non-signatories (see above). The upper bound
of the ’brown’ IEA interval d¯ is derived from the condition q¯bind = x
n + yn. For ’brown’
IEAs the hold-up effect dominates the public good effect in an IEA facing a new abatement
technology protected by TRIPs.
The lower bound of the cost parameter of the new technology for ’brown’ IEAs is driven by
the lack of credibility for even laxer abatement targets. Reducing the target even more would
7See benchmark 2 in appendix A.1.
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Figure 1: Abatement levels by (a) signatories under TRIPS and (b) non-signatories under
TRIPs and by signatories (c) under discriminatory but ex-ante fixed pricing at ps = 2k(1+d)
3+4d
and pn = b
2
, i.e. at equilibrium prices but without the hold-up, (d) under uniform pricing
at ps = pn = b
2
and (e) under competitive provision of the new technology (N = 100; b =
0.01; k = 2).
induce the patent holding firm to abandon price-discrimination. This, in turn, renders the
abatement incentives for signatories and non-signatories identical. Signatories hence would
want to abate more than required by the rules of the IEA. As we assumed that an IEA only
imposes minimum abatement requirements, the IEA becomes void.
Before we solve the final stage of the game, the coalition formation, let’s take stock of the
effects of TRIPs on outcomes given the number of signatories to an IEA is exogenous. First,
TRIPs create market power that induces the patent holding firm to set a license fee that raises
the costs of using the new technology above its social marginal costs. We therefore observe
the standard static inefficiency associated with intellectual property rights: abatement by
the new technology is less than in the absence of TRIPs. The second main effect is new:
the demand elasticity - and hence the level of the license fee - is a function of abatement
targets agreed to in the IEA. More ambitious targets make signatories more reliant on the
new technology and hence more vulnerable to exploitation by the innovator. Consequently,
signatories commit to laxer targets in the IEA stage internalizing their joint effect on the
license fee. This strategic interaction between signatories and the innovator is a product of
the hold-up effect, and for a higher number of signatories, the new technology needs to be
increasingly cost-saving relative to the incumbent one in order to escape the effect.
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4 TRIPs and self-enforcing IEAs
This section analyzes how monopolistic provision of the new technology affects the equilib-
rium size of the coalition forming an IEA, aggregate welfare and abatement and welfare of
the innovator’s home country. We start by applying the standard stability conditions for a
self-enforcing IEA,
pin(k∗ − 1) ≤ pis(k∗), (23)
pin(k∗) ≥ pis(k∗ + 1), (24)
to the two possible outcomes of the commitment stage (binding/non-binding targets). As-
suming that abatement targets are binding, the only stable coalition contains two countries
(k∗ = 2) and requires that abatement using the new technology is sufficiently costly, i.e.
d ≥
√
7−2
4
≈ 0.1614. This threshold is always less restrictive than the feasibility threshold
dˆ(k) evaluated at k∗ = 2.8 Hence, given that N ≥ 3, the optimal coalition size is independent
of both b and N since the stability conditions depend on neither. In this case, the number of
signatories is always smaller than in the cases where either only one technology is available
or both are priced competitively since in both cases k∗bench = 3 (see appendix A.1). However,
it can be shown (see appendix) that it is not uniquely the hold-up problem that causes the
coalition size to shrink. The same also happens in the two exogenous pricing scenarios (c)
and (d) presented in Figure 1.
If abatement using the new technology is sufficiently cheap (d ≤ 2
√
13−5
12
), then all coun-
tries are indifferent between no IEA and any IEA with one or more signatories. The mul-
tiplicity of equilibria arises because commitments made as part of the IEA are nonbinding
and hence have no effect on outcomes and payoffs. All countries continue to behave like
non-signatories. Hence, there might be IEAs (with up to N signatories) that set minimum
abatement levels that will be exceeded by all signatories.
The core questions of this paper are the impact of TRIPs on the formation of IEAs, the
commitments that countries enter into when they form, and the welfare effects associated
with this outcome. To characterize these impacts, we again compare the above equilibrium
of the participation game under TRIPs with the equilibrium under competitive supply of
the new technology.
Proposition 2 (Number of Signatories)
• For all d > dˆ(2) the equilibrium number of signatories in a self-enforcing IEA is two
(k∗ = 2) and hence strictly smaller than in the absence of TRIPs.
• For all d ≤ dˆ(2) the equilibrium number of signatories to a self-enforcing IEA is between
zero and N , but all countries behave exactly like non-signatories, and abatement levels
and payoffs are independent of the number of signatories. Compared to an absence of
TRIPS, any IEA concluded is therefore substantively empty.
8Simply observe that dˆ(2) = 2
√
13−5
12 ≈ 0.184 >
√
7−2
4 ≈ 0.1614.
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The first part of the proposition highlights how IPRs on the new abatement technol-
ogy have a detrimental effect on the stability of effective IEAs. The intuition for this is
straightforward. Recall that incentives to join (or not to leave) an IEA are created by the
abatement response by other signatories induced by entry into the coalition. The higher
price for the new technology, price discrimination between signatories and non-signatories
and the hold-up problem between the patent holder and signatories to the IEA dampens this
response. As a result, the equilibrium number of signatories drops from three to two for all
but the most productive of abatement technologies if a global patent is granted. Part two
of Proposition 2 follows from Proposition 1. For the remainder of this section, we focus on
the more interesting case in which IEAs yield binding minimum abatement targets, starting
first with a consideration of global abatement levels.
The effect of TRIPs on global abatement, relative to the case when the new technology
is priced competitively, is clear. Both signatories to the IEA and non-signatories abate less
under a global patent than their counterparts that have access to the new technology at
marginal costs. Moreover, there are fewer signatories under a global patent (two instead
of three) and hence aggregate abatement under a global patent is always less than with a
competitively priced new technology, everything else equal.
We can also compare the outcome under TRIPs with the case where there is only the
incumbent technology and an alternative new technology is not available. While both signa-
tories and non-signatories always abate more if the new technology is available than if this
is not the case (diversification effect), the number of signatories is reduced by one which
increases total abatement for ’brown’ IEAs and decreases it for ’green’ IEAs (size effect).
Hence, for ’brown’ IEAs both effects work in the same direction and total abatement un-
der TRIPs is higher than without a new technology. However, for ’green’ IEAs the two
effects are antagonistic. The diversification effect, however, becomes smaller the higher the
cost parameter d of the new proprietary technology: Expensive technologies deliver fewer
gains from diversification. As can be seen from Figure 1 the difference in abatement ef-
forts between signatories and non-signatories increases in d. For sufficiently large values
of d, the IEA size effect dominates the diversification effect and as a result, in a world
with TRIPs, eco-innovation can reduce global abatement. This defines a threshold value
d˜(N) = 1
16
(
N − 6 +√N2 + 12N − 12
)
whose implications are the matter of Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 (Aggregate abatement) For all N ≥ 3, b and
d > d˜(N), a second technology becoming available on a proprietary basis is associated with
less aggregate abatement than when only the incumbent technology is available.
To illustrate Proposition 3, Figure 2 presents global abatement under the monopolistic
provision of the new technology and two benchmark cases (1: only incumbent technology
available; 2: both technologies priced competitively) using a specific numerical example.
Does Proposition 3 imply that innovation might reduce welfare if patents are granted? Not
so. On the one hand, a reduction in global abatement results in a loss of social benefits
induced by a deterioration of environmental quality. On the other hand, the horizontal
nature of innovation and the fact that both technologies are used in equilibrium imply that
any given level of abatement is achieved at lower social costs than if only one technology is
available. Hence, if the cost saving effect dominates the loss incurred due to lower overall
abatement, global welfare increases as a result of innovation even in situations when global
13
Figure 2: Global abatement with and without a global patent and with only the incumbent
technology (N = 100; b = 0.01).
abatement is reduced. The dominance of the cost saving effect in the present set-up is the
message of the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Global welfare) Global welfare is, ceteris paribus, always higher when the
additional technology is protected by IPRs compared to only the incumbent technology being
available.
Propositions 3 and 4 contain the key results on the effect of TRIPs on green technologies
for the global outcome in terms of environmental quality and welfare. Taken together, their
message confirms that from a welfare perspective, diffusion is desirable irrespective of the
presence of TRIPs regime. However, the gains from diffusion do not necessarily give rise
to enhanced environmental quality. In this stylized setting, it is a distinct possibility that
total abatement will decrease. The positive welfare effects arise mainly in the form of lower
abatement costs. The hold-up problem created by the interplay of IEA and TRIPs introduces
an additional dampening effect when considering what benefits technology diffusion will
deliver to global society.
A final consideration in our analysis are the welfare effects not at the aggregate level,
but at the level of the country that hosts the innovating firm. These effects are of interest
in light of the arguments that green technologies will yield significant patent rents to host
countries that we reviewed in the introduction. Is it true that proprietary management of
green innovations is a boon to the countries hosting the innovator? Do countries benefit from
being a winner of the so-called ’green race’ (Friedman and Hot 2008). The answer depends on
the benchmark used for comparison. Given the symmetry assumed in our model, it certainly
holds that, given a global patent is granted to the innovating firm, it is always strictly better
hosting the successful firm than not. Clearly, it is better winning the prize than paying for
it. However, an interesting insight from the simple model of IEA and TRIPs is that such
proprietary management of the innovation may not be in the interest of the host country.
Given a domestic firm wins the R&D race, a globally enforceable perfect patent turns out
to be harmful to the host country’s welfare.
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Proposition 5 (Host country welfare) The home country of the innovating firm is worse off
under a global patent than when the new technology is competitively available to all countries
at marginal costs given that the new technology has already been developed.
Proposition 5 holds regardless of whether the home country is a signatory or not. Gen-
erally, the result that patents induce static inefficiencies and hence a loss in post-innovation
welfare compared to a competitive provision of the new technology would not be surprising.
What makes it noteworthy is that this holds in the present case despite the fact that most
of the deadweight loss of the firm’s monopolistic pricing occurs in other countries and most
of the royalties are paid by foreigners. The capturing of rents via the royalty payments is
outweighed by the negative impact on the global public good induced by monopoly pricing.
The proponents of green patent rents are therefore half right: Narrow measures of economic
performance like GDP are likely to be higher with proprietary management of green inno-
vations than without. Broader domestic welfare measures, however, that include damages
from the global environmental good are here unambiguously lower without patents. Enforc-
ing IPRs in green innovations backfires. The presence and nature of the effect is most easily
verified for non-signatories due to the linear-quadratic specification of the model. Abatement
provided by the incumbent technology is not affected by IPRs and hence can be ignored in
this context while abatement by the new technology in the case with IPRs ( b
2d
) is half of
what it would be in the absence of monopolistic pricing ( b
d
). Hence, the base on which
the license fee is charged and the reduction in abatement are exactly the same. For each
non-signatory, the country hosting the innovating firm receives royalties of size b
2
· b
2d
= b
2
4d
but sees its environmental benefits reduced by b · b
2d
= b
2
2d
, where b
2
is the license fee and
b the marginal domestic benefit of abatement. The latter is exactly twice the former. A
similar argument can be made for signatories and hence IPRs generate a net loss in terms
of domestic social welfare given the new technology exists, even for the country receiving all
the royalty payments.
5 Addressing the strategic distortions of TRIPS on
IEAs
The analysis above highlights the important efficiency implications of agreeing on interna-
tional treaties limiting emissions when such agreements take place against an institutional
background in which the international diffusion of climate-relevant technologies is governed
by a perfect form of TRIPS. The efficiency implications are the result of strategic distortions
that arise between the market power of IP owners and countries’ ability to manipulate their
demand elasticity for more advanced technologies when negotiating IEAs.
The extent to which the existing form of TRIPS gives rise to the effect described above
is an empirical matter that hinges both on the imitability of ’green’ technologies and the
enforceability of the applicable IPRs in adopter countries (Hall and Helmers 2013, Reichman
et al. 2008). In contrast to the pharmaceutical sector, however, there is little empirical data
to provide guidance for estimating the scale of the effect. However, the pharmaceutical sector
also provides clear lessons on the inertia of international negotiations regarding the ability of
an global IPR regime to accommodate exemptions for special sectors (Reichman et al. 2008).
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Suggestions for alterations to TRIPS need to be mindful of the difficulty of enshrining such
exemptions within existing frameworks, in particular when there is considerable difficulty in
delimiting the concept of ’climate-relevant technologies.’
Overcoming the distortions that the presence of TRIPS imposes on the success of IEAs
requires severing the link between demand elasticity and technology pricing. One way of
severing this link is the implementation of proposals for compulsory licensing as advocated
by some members of the UNFCCC Ad-hoc Working Group. This would involve compelling
technology owners to license their technology at either fixed or non-discriminatory prices.
Since compulsory licensing leads to a form of regulated monopoly (Scotchmer 2004), the reg-
ulatory component would break the link between the pricing decision of the innovator and the
abatement commitment of potential signatories. This would in turn remove any incentive
for countries to evaluate their abatement and signing decision under strategic considera-
tions vis-a-vis the technology provider. Implementing proposals for compulsory licensing,
however, would require countries to collectively support a fundamental change to TRIPS
itself. The legal basis for IPR in technologies related to climate change would have to shift,
with far-reaching implications for investment in research and development for future ’green’
technologies .
In light of such implications, a resolution of the hold-up problem that respects existing
property rights in the underlying technology are more likely to qualify as feasible. One such
resolution is the idea of governments individually or jointly buying out innovators. The
appeal of such patent buy-outs is that, properly devised, they have the potential to resolve
not just the hold-up problem, but also the deadweight loss of monopoly power that inhibits
the diffusion of existing technologies (Kremer 1998). The end effect would be a situation of
perfectly competitive supply, as depicted in the highest curve in Figure 2: The formation of
the IEA on emissions abatement would be unaffected by the possibility of a hold-up, and
global abatement levels would lie strictly above those implied by the monopolistic supply of
the additional technology. Despite these desirable properties, there are at least two problems
with patent buyouts: One is that they represent a major, and essentially untested, departure
from existing IPR systems. The other is that the likely scale of fiscal resources required
would give rise to a higher-order problem of an international agreement on contributions
from different countries towards the buyout fund (Barrett 2006).
A review of our results above suggests an institutionally much less demanding and also
credible mechanism for overcoming the hold-up problem. This mechanism relies on the self-
interest of the country in which the innovator is located, rather than that of adopter countries,
and therefore only requires domestic policy action. The hold-up problem is resolved by an
announcement by the host country early in the process that it will impose, through company
taxation or otherwise, a ceiling on the price that can be charged for technology licenses.
This price ceiling is determined by the optimal amount of technology diffusion from the host
country’s point of view, which is strictly greater than that of the innovator. Irrespective of
whether the host country is a signatory to the IEA or not, the optimal price ceiling for the
new technology lies strictly below the price that the innovator would charge signatories after
signing the IEA.9 Most importantly, the host country’s announcement is credible since it
9The optimal price ceiling does differ in the signatory status of the host country, with a signatory host
country charging a higher price than a non-signatory.
16
will find it optimal to impose the ceiling in later stages of the game irrespective of signatory
status and abatement commitments of itself or other countries. This allows IEA members
to negotiate abatement commitments non-strategically (i.e. without the hold-up problem),
leading to more abatement and more technology adoption but with somewhat lower rents
for the innovator.10 The country hosting the innovator can therefore make a simple, but
important contribution to addressing the strategic distortions of TRIPS on IEA without
requiring a fundamental overhaul of existing global institutions. While there are ex-ante
fixed price levels that would make everyone strictly better off than in the hold-up case (e.g.
case (c) in Figure 1), it is not in the interest of the country hosting the innovator to enforce
them.
6 Conclusion
By general agreement, the success of global GHG mitigation policies will over the coming 20
to 25 years depend on the effective diffusion of green technologies from corporate laboratories
in industrialized countries to the rest of the world. If correct, such a dependence implies
that the success will be shaped by how the institutions for international environmental
agreements on emissions reductions and for access to advanced technologies interact. These
institutions, the IEAs on GHG emissions and trade-related intellectual property rights, and
their interaction is the subject of intense political debate at the international level, but is
only beginning to be properly understood due to the inherent complexities of simultaneously
resolving problems of international environmental policy and technology policy. This paper
examines the interaction between IEA formation and TRIPs in a simple and tractable model.
In addition to the predictable result that rent extraction possibilities afforded by a global
IPR regime lead not only to higher prices for the new technology and hence less technology
adoption than would be globally optimal, the model more importantly highlights a strategic
reduction in abatement commitments by countries. As we discuss, the reason is a hold-up
effect that induces countries negotiating an international environmental agreement to change
their behavior in anticipation of the rent extraction by the innovator. As a result of this
hold-up problem, international environmental agreements can be harmful to the environment
as they turn from an institutional response to a cooperation problem into one that also
addresses a market structure problem. Global welfare from diffusion remains positive, but
may be associated with less abatement. Also, pursuing green patent rents may not be in the
interest of the country hosting the innovator. While it is correct that the innovation rents
extracted can offset own abatement expenditures, the gains to the country from a socially
optimal global adoption of the technology may exceed the losses from foregoing patent rents.
Perhaps surprisingly, countries should find it more profitable to give away breakthrough
technologies rather than technologies of incremental improvements. The spirit of this paper
is strictly positive, and our modeling framework of perfect global patents is deliberately stark
in order to draw the effects out as clearly as possible. The weaker patent regimes of the real
10While the greater volume of technology adoption raises patent rents for the innovator relative to a
situation with hold-up, the quantity effect is insufficient for offsetting the price effect. In other words, the
innovator prefers the hold-up situation to the imposition of a price ceiling, even though the latter reduces
distortions.
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world may already go some way towards attenuating some of the effects brought out in this
paper. However, these weaknesses are typically more accidental than deliberate. We explore
some policy options that respect existing property rights but avoid the strategic interaction
between signatories to an IEA and innovators. While Pareto-improvements over the hold-up
case exist they tend not to be stable. However, a price ceiling for license fees imposed by the
country hosting the innovator is both time consistent, provides higher levels of abatement
and at the same time allows the innovator to earn rents. A comprehensive reconsideration
of the regimes that should govern international cooperation on abatement and the diffusion
of technologies required to accomplish these abatement goals will need to show awareness of
the issues raised here.
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A Appendix
A.1 Benchmarks with freely available technologies
Here we briefly derive the equilibrium quantities and stable coalition size for two cases where
technologies are freely available (ps = pn = 0), i.e. priced competitively. Case 1 (also called
benchmark 1) features only one, the incumbent technology while in case (benchmark) 2 both
technologies are available. Formally 1 is a special case of 2 with output of the new technology
restricted to be zero (y = 0).
The equilibrium quantities of non-signatories follow directly from equations (4) and (5). For
benchmark 1 they are given by (4) and for benchmark 2 they are xnb2 = b and y
n
b2 =
b
d . Since the
price setting stage of the technology innovator (stage 3) does not exist, stages 4 and 2 are collapsed
into a single stage which substantially simplifies the analysis.
Signatories solve the following optimization problem
max
xi,yi
b
[
kb2q¯
i + (N − kb2)b1 + d
d
]
− 1
2
(
xi
)2 − d
2
(
yi
)2
. (A.1)
Imposing symmetry among all signatories (s), equilibrium abatement by a signatory is
xsb1 = x
s
b2 = kb2b, (A.2)
ysb2 = kb2
b
d
. (A.3)
For benchmark 1 the profit of signatories is pisb1 =
b2
2
(
2N − 2kb1 + k2b1
)
and the profit of non-
signatories is pinb1 =
b2
2
(
2N − 2kb1 + 2k2b1 − 1
)
. Substituting both into condition pinb1(k
∗
b1 − 1) ≤
pisb1(k
∗
b1) yields k
2
b1 − 4kb1 + 3 ≤ 0. This implies 1 ≤ k∗b1 ≤ 3. Condition pinb1(k∗b1) ≥ pisb1(k∗b1 + 1)
requires that kb1 − 2 ≥ 0. The equilibrium number of signatories is hence k∗b1 = 3.
Profit functions of both signatories and non-signatories in benchmark 2 are multiples of their
counterparts in benchmark 1. The size of a self-enforcing IEA is therefore three (k∗b2 = k
∗
b1 = 3) in
both benchmarks.
For horizontal innovation, the presence of a second abatement technology that is freely available
unambiguously increases abatement by both signatories and non-signatories but does not affect the
size and stability of an IEA.
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A.2 Optimal abatement and adoption by signatories
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions of optimization problem (6) are
b− cxs − λ = 0 (A.4)
b− dys − ps − λ = 0 (A.5)
q¯ − xs − ys ≤ 0 (A.6)
λ ≥ 0 (A.7)
If constraint (A.6) is not binding and hence λ = 0, (A.4) and (A.5) yield . If (A.6) is binding,
combining (A.4), (A.5) and (A.6) yields (7) and (8).
A.3 Proof of equation (11)
The price threshold is determined by (9) being equal to (7) and (10) being equal to (8). Using
either condition and solving for ps yields (11).
A.4 Technology pricing
The innovator’s profit from license fees paid by a non-signatory is pin = pn · yn(pn). Using (5), the
first order condition yields
b− 2pn
d
= 0. (A.8)
Solving for pn yields (14).
The profit obtained from a signatory is pis = ps · ys(ps) where demand for the new technology
is given by the piecewise function (8). For ps ≤ pˆ, the first order condition requires b−2psd = 0
and hence ps = b2 . For the latter to be in the specified range (p
s ≤ pˆ) it has to hold that,
q¯ ≤ qnonbind = b(1+2d)2cd .
For ps > pˆ, the first order condition requires q¯−2p
s
1+d = 0 and hence p
s = q¯2 . For the latter to be
in the specified range (ps > pˆ) it has to hold that, q¯ > qbind = b(1+d)1/2+d .
Note that qbind < qnonbind and hence there is a range where the innovator can choose whether
signatories’ commitment q¯ is binding or not. The innovator is indifferent between the two outcomes
if
b
2
· b
2d
=
qˆ
2
· qˆ
2(1 + d)
, (A.9)
qˆ = b
√
1 + d
d
. (A.10)
Hence, signatories’ commitment binds for all q¯ > qˆ but does not for all q¯ ≤ qˆ.
A.5 Proof of equation (21)
Using q¯ = xs (q¯) + ys (q¯), the first-order condition of (20) is
bk − cxs (q¯) ∂x
s
∂q¯
− dys (q¯) ∂y
s
∂q¯
−
[
ps (q¯)
∂ys
∂q¯
+ ys (q¯)
∂ps
∂q¯
]
= 0. (A.11)
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Substituting in ∂x
s
∂q¯ =
1+2d
2(1+d) ,
∂ys
∂q¯ =
1
2(1+d) and
∂ps
∂q¯ =
1
2 derived from (15), (18) and (19) and
simplifying, yields,
4bk(1 + d)− (3 + 4d)q¯
4(1 + d)
= 0. (A.12)
Solving for q¯ yields (21).
A.6 Ex-ante fixed pricing scenarios in Figure 1
A.6.1 Differentiated license fees at equilibrium level
License fees for both signatories and non-signatories are ex-ante fixed at their equilibrium levels,
i.e. ps = 2kb(1+d)3+4d and p
n = b2 . Non-signatories hence behave exactly as with endogenous license
fees. However, the commitment problem of signatories changes as they no longer have an impact
on the license fee charged by the patent holding firm. Equilibrium quantities are:
q =
b(1 + d)((3 + 4d)k − 4)
d(3 + 4d)
, (A.13)
xs = bk, (A.14)
ys =
b(3k − 4 + 4d(k − 1))
d(3 + 4d)
. (A.15)
For all k ≥ 2 it holds that q = b(1+d)((3+4d)k−4)d(3+4d) > 4kb(1+d)3+4d = q¯ and that q = b(1+d)((3+4d)k−4)d(3+4d) >
b2d+12d = x
n + yn, hence the commitment level of signatories when the license fees are ex-ante fixed
at the equilibrium level of the hold-up game is strictly greater than commitment by signatories and
abatement by non-signatories in the hold-up game for all relevant coalition sizes.
A.6.2 Uniform license fee at equilibrium level for non-signatories
If license fees for both signatories and non-signatories are ex-ante fixed at the level of non-signatories
in the hold-up game (ps = pn = b2), then the resulting commitment level is q =
b( 1
2
+k(1+d)
d which is
strictly larger than the abatement commitment with differentiated license fee presented above for
all coalition sizes.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 2
Condition pin(k∗ − 1) ≤ pis(k∗) imposes an upper bound on the number of signatories.
k∗ ≤ 8d(1 + d) +
√
d (16d3 + 32d2 + 13d− 3)
4d(1 + d)
. (A.16)
Which is bound from below by 2 and from above by 3 (if d approaches plus infinity).
Condition pin(k∗) ≥ pis(k∗ + 1) imposes an lower bound on the number of signatories.
k∗ ≥ 4d(1 + d) +
√
d (16d3 + 32d2 + 13d− 3)
4d(1 + d)
, (A.17)
which is bound from below by 1 and from above by 2 (if d approaches plus infinity).
Conditions (A.16) and (A.17) have no real solutions if d <
√
7−2
4 ≈ 0.1614.
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A.8 Proof of coalition size under ex-ante fixed license fee scenarios
A.8.1 Differentiated license fees at equilibrium level
Abatement levels for signatories when the license fee ps, now evaluated at k = 2 to reflect the
coalition size in a self-enforcing IEA, is ex-ante fixed at the equilibrium level of the hold-up game
were derived in section A.6. Non-signatories’ abatement choices are not affected by the hold-up
problem are given by (16) and (17). Substituting them into the stability conditions of a self-
enforcing IEA and solving for the critical (strictly positive) ks yields
k∗ ≤ 28 + 108d+ 144d
2 + 64d3 +
√−89− 213d+ 740d2 + 3552d3 + 5504d4 + 3840d5 + 1024d6
2(9 + 33d+ 40d2 + 16d3)
,(A.18)
k∗ ≥ −6 + 10d+ 48d
2 + 32d3 +
√
36− 165d− 812d2 − 224d3 + 2176d4 + 2816d5 + 1024d6
2(9d+ 24d2 + 16d3)
,(A.19)
(A.18) has real solutions for all d ≥ 0.26137, is bound from above by 3 and drops below 2
for d < 0.418206. (A.19) is bound from above by 2 and has no real solution in the interval
[0.132914, 0.530504]. The latter does not affect stability since in this range countries never want
to leave an IEA. Hence, for all d ≥ 0.418206 the IEA has exactly two members while below this
threshold there is no IEA.
A.8.2 Uniform license fee at equilibrium level for non-signatories
Abatement levels for signatories when the license fees ps and pn are ex-ante fixed at b2 were derived in
section A.6. Non-signatories’ abatement choices are again given by (16) and (17). Substituting them
into the stability conditions of a self-enforcing IEA and solving for the critical (strictly positive) ks
yields
k∗ ≤ 6 + 5d+
√
12 + 28d+ 17d2
4(1 + d)
, (A.20)
k∗ ≥ 2, (A.21)
(A.20) has a real solution for all d ≥ 0, is strictly larger than 5+
√
17
4 > 2 and has a maximum of
6+2
√
3
4 < 3 at d = 0. The size of a self-enforcing IEA when the uniform license fee is p = p
s = pn = b2
is therefore k∗ = 2.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 3
Using the results from A.1 yields global abatement Qb1 = (N+6)b if only the incumbent technology
is available. Using k = 2, (16), (17), (18) and (19) in combination with (21) yields global abatement
Q = b
[
(N − 2)1+2d2d + 16(1+d)3+4d
]
with two technologies and IPRs. Setting Qb1 = Q and solving for d
yields the critical point d˜(N) = 116
(
N − 6 +√N2 + 12N − 12
)
. For all d > d˜(N) global abatement
under a patent is less than when only the incumbent technology is available and vice versa.
A.10 Proof of Proposition 4
Global welfare in the benchmark with only the incumbent technology is Wone = b
2 (N−12)
2 . Global
welfare with two technologies and IPRs is W = b2 27(N−2)+64d
3(N−2)+16d2(9N−2)+4d(27N+10)
8d(3+4d)2
. It
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holds that ∂W∂d = − b
2
8d2(3+4d)3
[
64d3(3N + 10) + 16d2(27N + 26) + 324d(N − 2) + 81(N − 2)] which
is negative for all N ≥ 2. Since limd→∞W = b2 (N−2)2 > Wone welfare with two technologies and
IPRs is always higher than in the benchmark with only the incumbent technology.
A.11 Proof of Proposition 5
If the home country is a non-signatory, welfare is given by
pin = b2
[
16
1 + d
3 + 4d
+ (N − 2)1 + 2d
2d
− 1
2
− 1
8d
+ 32
1 + d
(3 + 4d)2
+
(N − 3)
4d
]
, (A.22)
if the country grants a global patent to the innovator and
pintwo = b
2
[
(N + 6)
1 + d
d
− 1
2
− 1
2d
]
, (A.23)
if it does not. Taking the difference between pin and pintwo and simplifying yields,
−(18N + 531)− d(48N + 1912)− d2(32N + 2336)− 960d3 < 0. (A.24)
The proof for signatory host country is analogous. The host country’s welfare is therefore
unambiguously higher if it does not grant a patent to the innovator.
A.12 Proof of preferred ex-ante price level of host country
Given ex-ante fixed license fees ps and pn, signatories commit to an abatement level of q(ps) =
and split this over technologies according to (7) and (8). Non-signatories will abate yn(pn) = b−p
n
d
using the new technology (see (5)). Substituting this into the host country’s welfare function yields
pis,host(ps, pn) = b
[
k
b(1 + d)k − ps
d
+ (N − k)b+ (b− p
n)
d
]
− 1
2
b2 − d
2
(
b− ps
d
)
+(k − 1)ps bk − p
s
d
+ (N − k)pn b− p
n
d
(A.25)
when the host is a signatory and
pin,host(ps, pn) = b
[
k
b(1 + d)k − ps
d
+ (N − k)b+ (b− p
n)
d
]
− 1
2
(bk)2 − d
2
(
bk − ps
d
)
+kps
bk − ps
d
+ (N − k − 1)pn b− p
n
d
(A.26)
when the host is a non-signatory. Maximizing each of the two objective function w.r.t pn and
ps yields pn = 0 in both cases and ps = bk(k−1)2k−1 when the host is a signatory and p
s = b(k−1)2 when
the host is a non-signatory. In case price-discrimination is not feasible, the host country would
prefer a uniform license fee of p = bk(k−1)2N−1 regardless of whether it is a signatory or not.
It holds that ps(hold−up) = 4bk(1+d)3+4d > ps(hostsignatory) = bk(k−1)2k−1 > ps(hostnon−signatory) =
b(k−1)
2 > p =
bk(k−1)
2N−1 .
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A.13 Proof of preferred ex-ante price ceiling of patent holder
If the patent holding firm could ex-ante commit to a fixed level of the license fee and thereby avoid
the hold-up problem, it maximizes profits (here equal to revenues) taking the best responses by
signatories (q(ps) = bk(1+d)−p
s
d ) and non-signatories (y
n(pn) = b−p
n
d ) as given. In the case where
price-discrimination is feasible this yields pn = b2 and p
s = bk2 . If price-discrimination is not feasible,
the patent holder prefers a license fee of p = bN+k
2−k
2N . It holds that p
s(hold − up) = 4bk(1+d)3+4d >
bk
2 = p
s(innovator) > bk(k−1)2k−1 = p
s(hostsignatory).
We now check whether the innovator prefers an ex-ante price ceiling at the level preferred by
the host country to the case with hold-up. The difference in profits from selling the new technology
to signatories is
b(k − 1)k
2k − 1
bk − b(k−1)k2k−1
d
− 2bk 1 + d
3 + 4d
bk − 2bk 1+d3+4d
d
= −b
2k2(2 + 6d+ 4d2 + k − k2)
d(3 + 4d)2(1− 2k)2 . (A.27)
For k = 2 this reduces to − b24(6d+4d2)
9d(3+4d)2
< 0. Hence, in the hold-up case the innovator earns
higher profits from signatories than under the ex-ante price ceiling preferred by the host country.
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